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Abstract The paper examines the intersection of technological design of Social
Media communication, the notion of post-politics-affective turn in contemporary
(Western) societies and the rise of populism as a trend in political communi-
cation. Following on conceptualizations for a Social Media approach to a
broadly defined critical discourse studies framework (KhosraviNik, in: Kalyango
and Kopytowska (eds) Why discourse matters: negotiating identity in the
mediatized world, Peter Lang, New York, 2014, in: Flowerdew and Richardson,
Routledge handbook of critical discourse studies, Routledge, London, 2017b), the
paper attempts to integrate discussions on affective nature of communication in
participatory web ecology and consequences of algorithmic regimentation of
meaning bearing resources (e.g., news and entertainment) on Social Media.
Issues around quality and distribution of digital discursive practices and their
relations to traditional perceptions of rational politics, within the internalised
ethos of visibility-as-legitimacy, are critically elaborated and examined. While
the rise of right wing populism (e.g., Trump presidency, Brexit vote) should
primarily be explicated within qualities of the context on the ground, i.e., the
deliberate and well-orchestrated misplacement of real grievances in society
through discursive operation and manipulation (KhosraviNik in Insight Turk
19(3):53–68, 2017a), it is equally important to critically elaborate the function
and consequences of (digital) media practices as a main part of this socialization
context. The overall argument here is that the hyper-normalization and triumph
of neo-liberal rationality together with new media technological affordances,
design and requirements have created a momentum for the growth of haphazard
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populist politics, i.e., the valorization of affective relevance over rational
significance.
Keywords Populism  Algorithms  Social Media politics  Digital
discourse  Critical discourse studies
The paper examines the links between technological design of Social Media
communication, the notions of post-politics-affective turns in contemporary
(Western) societies and the rise of populism as a trend in political communication.
Populism has been discussed in terms of its discursive content, anti-establishmen-
tarianism, and its affective rather than argumentative characteristics. In other words,
it has been studied both as political/ideological content as well as a style of
communication. Right wing populism has particularly been on the rise in the West
in recent years (Richardson 2013; Wodak et al. 2013) evidenced by electoral gains
in France and Germany, Brexit vote and the presidency of Donald Trump in the US.
As far as the politics on the ground is concerned, the rise of populism is rooted in
hyper-normalization of offshoots of neo-liberal life order (KhosraviNik 2017a), e.g.,
extreme individualism, competitive (rather than deliberative) persuasion and
foregrounding of relatability over rationality. In political communication, this
translates to rise of personality politics, triumphant of affect over argumentation and
reduction of democratic project to media(tised) performance. In fact, there is a
strong suggestion that we are now in a post-politics, post-ideology era, i.e., grand
narratives of politics have lost credibility and resonance.
In line with the promotional mantra of Social Media, i.e., the democratization of
access, the current political discourses maintain an appeal to some form of
(caricature) democratic practice along the lines of claims to empowerment of the
‘ordinary citizens’, re-connection with politics, grass-root mobilization, etc.
Incidentally, these constitute the core characteristics of new digital media
technologies as well which work with the logic of regimes of popularity building
through engagement of prosumers (Ritzer and Jurgenson 2010). The appeal of
affective political engagement and the rise of Social Media personality politics are,
on the one hand, predicated on internalization of the equation: visibility/popularity
is legitimacy (derived from accumulated symbolic power, i.e., power is legitimacy)
and, on the other hand, works as a revolt against the perceived monolithic nature of
traditional mass media/politics. Both these elements overlap with the populist
vociferous claims of revolting against the media and political establishments. The
design values and processes at work in Social Media technologies, their political
economic model, their starting assumption of post-ideological status of contempo-
rary societies and obsoleteness of critical structural politics are constitutively
aligned with promoting an affective-driven, anti-establishment, anti-elite/expert,
everyday/banal politics. In a similar vein, the extreme individualization and the
corporate algorithmic manipulation of news and information pave the way for
normalization of a populist perception of public communication and collective
identity—in political as well as all other domains.
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The algorithmic surveillance of Social Media is not an ideological machine in a
traditional sense, i.e., it appears to be neutral, automatic and machine controlled. It
aspires to claim that there is no human interference in fine grain regimentation of
content catered for millions of individual prosumers. This works within the frame
and contributes to the legitimacy of post-politics, post-ideology arguments,
especially in Media and Technology research approaches. This paper attempts to
understand the link between the contemporary politics, new media technologies and
their impacts on social understanding of traditional politics as a realm of rationality
and enlightenment. Hyper-normalization and triumph of neo-liberal rationality in
late modern societies and new media affordances have created a momentum for the
growth of haphazard populist politics in every sense. Social Media at the age of
behavioral advertising are the epitome of preference of affective relevance over
rational significance. Trump performance in the US is a prime example of this trend,
not only for the content of his populist right wing views and the typical strategic
misplacements of working class grievances (KhosraviNik 2017b), but also because
he has successfully reduced the entirety of political practice to a form of obsessive
and whimsical Social Media practice.
The essence of politics in modern time, i.e., in post-enlightenment era, is
(aspiring to) rationality and deliberative argumentation. The historical antecedent of
such strong adherence to objective rationality in modern western philosophy could
be traced to the reactions against the monopoly of church and religion in the Middle
Ages who would habitually employ affective means to control masses (Papacharissi
2015: 11). This is also linked to an established orientalist trope, which presupposes
that western mentality is driven by rationality in thought hence argumentation
versus the essential emotionality of Eastern subjects/thought. Many western thinkers
have based their social, political and cultural conceptualization on an inherent
priority of the rational over the affective. This is the presupposed assumption in
construction of entire modern polity as well as all various aspects of political
structure and relations of democratic understanding of legitimacy and power. This
remains the constant driving aspirational impetus in the face of various forces,
which do impact the processes adversely and sway it from the ideal functioning of
democratic process including major obstacles posed by the political economic order
and increasing normalization of market-based rationality. In the meantime, politics
has always been understood as both argumentative content as well as style of
communication. This is essentially because politics is about persuasion and
persuasion naturally pertains to the questions of what (is being communicated) as
well as how (it is being communicated) as previously argued in critical discourse
studies inter alia (KhosraviNik 2010, 2015a, b). It is also a fact that certain styles of
political communication are more attuned to specific political tendencies, e.g., the
links between authoritarianism and populism. In the same vein, right wing populism
discourses are characterized by a set of common and recurring discursive strategies,
albeit in varying degrees of intensity and scale. Firstly, there is the call for a swift
and radical shift from a globalization rationale towards a national and nativist
politics. This discursive strategy criticizes the normalized economic politics in the
west, i.e., economic liberalism, free movement of capital and labor, and
deregulation of financial markets—even though, all these are usually reduced to
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an anti-immigration rhetoric in populist discourse (KhosraviNik 2017a; Marsdal
2013).
Social Media technologies have affected norms of political communication in
general and political activism in particular. Now, ordinary users can be part of
production, consumption and distribution of content with few or no barriers in the
form of traditional gate-keeping practices (KhosraviNik 2014, 2017b). With an
oversimplified take on the democratization project, the perception of free access has
come to be celebrated as a new frontier for democratic circulation of forms of media
content; nevertheless, the potentials of the participatory web in civil, political and
social mobilization cannot be categorically dismissed. It is a fact that various groups
of ordinary to professional text producers, i.e., bloggers, followers, raters, sharers,
likers, as well as traditional journalists, form nodes in an information environment
with the potential to organize themselves for various progressive aims. This is not
only about transferring content and values per se, but it is about being a site for
formation and substantiation of these values, information and worldviews that is
discourse (KhosraviNik 2017b). New Media technologies and communicative
affordances continue to impact social and political fabrics of societies in (sometimes
radically) different ways. Specifically in the context of the Middle East, with
(largely) restricted public spheres, the communicative affordances of Social Media
have provided opportunities for new forms of citizen activism, construction of
alternative identities and deliberations despite the contentious relations of political
regimes with the new technology (KhosraviNik and Zia 2014; KhosraviNik and
Sarkhoh 2017; KhosraviNik and Kelsey forthcoming). The new technologies have
(arguably) empowered ordinary civilians to engage in political and cultural
communications and to contribute to expression, formation and dissemination of
discourses away from (usually closed) official channels (KhosraviNik and Zia
2014).
Despite the crucial differences in social fabrics and political practices in global
contexts, the breeding ground, characteristics and discursive strategies of populist
nationalist discourses have striking similarities. In essence, populist nationalist
discourse pivots around a real or constructed problem in the social, economic and
political status quo. It revolves around discursive construction of a homogenously
perceived Self, e.g., Us (the British) versus a homogenously perceived other, e.g.,
Them (the immigrants, Muslims or by extension EU nationals). Such discourses
often fill the gap created by the public’s disenchantment with official politics
(Wodak and KhosraviNik 2013) while presenting themselves as the indigenous,
socially relevant, and righteous alternative to worldviews of the (constructed)
establishment. Populist rhetoric is overtly preoccupied with the notion of (re)gaining
the (lost) power to actualize a romanticized perception of the past. Trump’s vote
was partly due to a perception of difference, which, as mentioned before, harvested
the outcome of a deliberately misplaced real grievance, orchestrated through a
discursive operation and manipulation. The trend towards unquestionable capitalist
rationale as the only norm and viable option of governance is also infused and
relegated to all the other aspects of live worlds of citizens. This is where the style,
dynamic and logics of competition, economic derive and extreme individualism are
taken up in provisions of goods and services and even worse, it permeates into life
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domains which had not previously been viewed as a realm of neo-liberal
subjugation, e.g., education, health care and life experience. This overwhelming
individual marketing approach dismantles society as a collective and when it hits
the domain of politics, it replaces facts with validation of favorable opinion.1
The hyper-normalization of a neo-liberal life order has translated itself into
approaches in political science and cultural studies which have started to do away
with radical critic and turned into approaches which claim to pay attention to micro-
level analysis of political communication, e.g., the rise of personal politics and
individualistically oriented studies on behavior and affect theory. Despite the fact
that there are also critical works within this paradigm, a lot of these approaches do
not require or have the inclination to critically engage with the macro-structural
issues. Macro-structural considerations would consider questions such as why
people act the way they do, or why personality and media management of public
faces are increasingly becoming more important than the policy and rational
deliberation, why the electorates are weary of big politics discussions and young
generations are disillusioned with politics, why large populations see politics as
irrelevant to their lives and why sensitivities and public knowledge around
democratic structure, values, rights are dwindling, why university students do not
show significant interest in understanding the basics of democracy or the need for
structural critique?
The de-politicization of communication as politics is also a dominant trend in
increasing digital participatory platforms. Social Media presented a shift in
communication dynamic, i.e., amalgamation of mass and interpersonal communi-
cation which has resonated suitably with the train of scholarly thought in affect
studies and their conceptualization. For many proponents of such affective turn in
social sciences, the ‘turn to affect becomes a decisive shift away from current
conceptions of critical theory, away from research based on discourse and
disembodied talk and texts, towards more vitalist, ‘post-human’ and processed-
based perspectives’ (Wetherell 2012: 3). The argument is that modern societies have
started to show uneasiness against grand narratives, extreme objectivity in reporting
human experience. Consequently, there is a shift in the foundational assumption that
politics is concerned with argumentative content and rational discourse. Most of
these trends have been afforded by mass communicative technologies in a range of
their textual practices from for example BBC’s approach in reporting news to a
range of entertainment programs. This is similar to notion of first-person media in
reference to the rise of reality TV. Similar argument can be put forward in
explaining the blogging explosion in early years of millennium and the subsequent
changes in digital content production afterwards. It is also a valid point to note that
while deliberation and rationality has been the canonical elements of political
debate, democracies have been and continue to be ‘messy affairs that are driven by
aspirations of rationality, caught up in the daily mise-en-scene of ethos, pathos and
logos’ and that citizens’ ‘typical daily responses to political developments are a mix
of emotion with fact-informed opinion’ (Papacharissi 2015: 26). In any case, it is
1 See Donald Trump’s comments on what he calls ‘alternative facts’ https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2017/jan/22/donald-trump-kellyanne-conway-inauguration-alternative-facts.
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given now that the bulk of Social Media spaces are essentially affective
communicative contexts with the centrality of sharing and connection. The research
shows that there is very little argumentative content even when Social Media are
appropriated for serious political causes (KhosraviNik and Zia 2014). This is not to
say that Social Media communication does not contain, allude to or draw on any
argumentative train of thought (topoi) but that there is little or no argumentative
content resembling a productive deliberation. Critical discourse analysis/studies as
an established critical approach focused on communication content as well as
contexts of production and consumption (Wodak and Meyer 2016; KhosraviNik
2017b) is predicated on the premise to attempt to explain how meaning bearing
content and behavior are used to create consent or political views. As such, it is only
prudent for the approach to integrate approaches in studying the affects/emotions in
its argumentation analytical models (Reisigl and Wodak 2016; KhosraviNik and
Unger 2016). Nevertheless, the affective turn in its strong conceptualization
‘involves more than adding emotions to the inventory of social research topics. It
signifies a more extensive ontological and epistemological upheaval, marking a
moment of paradigm change’ (Wetherell 2012: 3) which in effect, with the
exception of what can be categorized as critical affective social studies (e.g.,
Pedwell 2014; Ahmed 2014), defines itself in contrast to discourse-based studies
albeit by viewing discourse within an essentially poststructuralist frame, i.e., not
necessarily CDA per se. The extreme affective conceptualization shies away from
notions such as critique, ideology and shades of social constructivism to the
advantage of a de-politicalized, super-localized analysis. This is not to cast away the
potential of affective analysis in attempting to understand how people are moved,
and what attracts them and more importantly ‘how social formations grab people/
how do the roller coaster of contempt, patriotism, hate and euphoria power public
scenes’ (Wetherell 2012: 2) which are the crucial aspects of contemporary societies
and their behavior (see Wodak et al. 2013). Yet, in their backlash against social
constructivism, there remains little room to conceptualize power in social
formations as power is, in essence, about discourse (KhosraviNik 2014). As far
as this view is concerned, any political matter, be it big P politics or small P
political, i.e., personal is political, is about power. It is about resisting, engaging,
challenging a social formation, a normalized identity; a discourse. Psychological
analyses of emotions and affects within an extreme individualistic ontology would
not lend themselves easily to conceptualization of the collective, unless they are
merged with critical social theory.
The relevance and usefulness of affective analysis should be acknowledged, not
because it is the most recent ‘turn’ in cultural studies and/or social sciences but in
that it is attending to aspects of research theorization which relates to the way
contemporary societies are behaving politically and more importantly the way
Social Media communication has come to either impact the society in that direction
or be a symptomatic realization of such change in itself. I approach this from a
practical point of view and the way it can contribute in understanding of what is
going on in the political debates, actions and democratization project as a whole,
within a socially oriented, critical analysis of communication which is CDS to me
(KhosraviNik 2017b). However, the mere fact of change in theoretical approach for
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the sake of change is obviously not ground breaking in and by itself. In other words,
defining affect as something which is merely just not discourse is hardly useful—
that is, if the research is socially committed.
For a Social Media space, discourse, emotive and the action, i.e., discursive
practice (actions of digital marks including) should all be considered together. In
traditions of classic discourse approaches, language in and within itself gets priority
whereby the rationality and argumentative powers are foregrounded as the main
power to persuasion and resonance. This is why there is substantial development of
models and tools for analyzing argumentation, fallacies and critical engagement
with the degree and quality of rationality in the language use. In the context of
digital media technologies, the argumentative content is less central compared to the
affective content. Therefore, persuasiveness is more sought after at the triangle of
discourse, digital action and the affective state of the individual users. At the
interface of participatory web affordance and the user, users have the (perception of)
chance of being able to act completely individualistic and are encouraged to
prioritize their affective moods, e.g., rage, fear, etc. while in the past these affective
qualities of individuals would be filtered, controlled and moderated by various
systems of mass media gate-keeping. For example, newspapers would not trust and
rely on a non-professional individual’s (perhaps one-sided and misguided)
assertions and would tend to evaluate the argumentative value and content whereas,
in Social Media, such an individual would see no barrier for not only expressing
themselves but also gaining credibility through popularity of expressions of their
argumentatively incoherent but affectively loaded and strong emotive proposition.
Coherence is after all a cognitive disposition as far as the audience is concerned.
This is exactly why notions of discourse are important. Discourse is what gives
coherence to seemingly fragmented expressions. Discourse is the scaffolding for
scattered subjective utterances. In this sense, Social Media platforms not only
empower and validate individual’s emotive understanding of the affairs but also
encourage a dynamic of communication that rewards such behavior with a form of
perceived validation.
The post-ideological, post-politics ethos is a dominant trend in Social Media
research and theorization. Notions like participation, democratization, and individ-
ualism are appropriated, perhaps not even deliberately, to discuss a utopian context
of communication brought about by digital affordances. Influential sociological
analysis of the impact of Social Media postulates that we have now entered a form
of socialization called network society which ‘present a qualitative change in human
experience’ (Castells 2009: 509). Participatory culture is the term Jenkins puts
forward to conceptualize the amalgamation of users, audiences, consumers and fans
in creation of cultural content. Papacharissi argues that networked digital structures
of expression of connection are overwhelmingly characterized by affects and uses
the term ‘networked publics’ as ‘publics that are restructured by networked
technologies and, therefore, simultaneously are (1) the space constructed through
networks technologies and (2) the imagined collective that emerges as a result of the
intersection of people, technology and practice (2015: 39).
The affective characteristics of Social Media communication are both a reflection
of the change of interest in society in terms of the shift to value first-person media as
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well as being the effect of the way the Social Media technologies are structurally
designed. The users’ engagement with Social Media technologies seem to occur in a
multi-layered collapsed context (Boyd 2008). This affords endless opportunities for
the users’ affective performance to appeal to audiences or textual consumers who
may have not even been envisaged at the initial state of triggering communication.
What follows from this is the tendency to emphasize the affective-subjective content
of the communicative from one hand and the use of provocation as a way to make
one’s performance more authentic and real—much similar to the way reality is
constructed in reality TV. It is also not entirely wrong to consider affective
communication as a form of political expression. ‘Affect conveys the intensity with
which an opinion is felt, and when expressed, it can intensify the sense of
empowerment experienced by the individual releasing the thought, emotion, or act
to the public (Papacharissi 2015: 113–114). Even though it is not necessarily
deliberative, it can be potentially a powerful political act. Much similar to earlier
works in feminism and gender identity, ‘affective gestures infuse the story telling of
the self with emotive impressions that enhance performances of the self but may
also entrap the self in a continuous loop of (mediated) affect’ (Papacharissi 2015:
114). In essence, the contentious argument here is that political discourse should not
be viewed, considered and evaluated only by the degrees the communication can
contribute to deliberation and to the extent Social Media spaces can be deemed as
part of public sphere in its classic understanding. But that affective expression is
also political because it relates to power and empowerment of the individual. ‘Style
is performance and performance is power’ while in the meantime, ‘claims to power
are performed’ (Papacharissi 2015: 114). It is sensible to view affective expressions
as part of political discourse not (just) because these are affective publics but (also)
as an outcry of marginalization process that the overwhelming global normalization
of neo-liberalism has caused. Capitalism has always had strong scaffolding
rationality whereby the values, norms and logics of market are presented and
inculcated as not only reasonable but as the only way of envisaging the life world,
e.g., the notions of economic development, competition and increasing corporati-
zation of social life and commodification of products, service and life experiences.
This macro logic has been hegemonic and invisibly enforced everywhere. This
could explain the empowerment process of affective expressions and doing away
with the usual overwhelming rationality. At the political level, such affective
tendency is only craved in the context that there is strong but incoherent grievances
in society in a way that the available normal pubic sphere does not provide
suitable platforms for such expressions. This could also explain the anti-intellectual
anti-science and in short anti-rationality revolt in recent elections in the UK and
USA (KhosraviNik 2017a). This takes us back again to qualities of the wider society
or thick context (Couldry 2012) and in fact relates to traditional social issues of
class and identity politics. It is apt to argue that any attempt in theorization of
affective communication as political would inadvertently take us back to social
context and critique in one way or another. De-politicalized, descriptive and super-
localized approaches which advocate a post-politics context for the contemporary
era are mainly derived (and contribute to) the understanding that within a
normalized economically colonized political sphere nothing can/should/does
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change; hence, engagement with politics in that sense is a moot endeavor. The
process of normalization of post-political context is both a top-down macro and
bottom up micro process. The post-politics actively denies that the real politics is
about policy, argumentation and overarching principles and happily reduces it to
media appearance, likeability, psychological connection and relatability in the
context that media industry vigorously continues to make advances in colonizing the
entirety of official politics. One driving force and culmination of such post-
ideological manipulation in practice are reflected and constituted in the logics and
dynamic of interaction on Social Media and participatory web.
Social Media are being used for a plethora of everyday uses and with increasing
penetration both in terms of the number of users and depth of engagements. There is
obviously a substantial entertainment aspect to the use of digital media. While the
big P politics and structural debates around it have not really benefited from these
spaces, i.e., in terms of enhancing the quality of political debate and deliberation,
the politics as everyday practice has been hugely impacted by Social Media (Zayani
2015). Entertainment industry had already been working with regimes of rating,
popularity and competition as their canon of business practice before Social Media.
As such, Social Media everyday politics and political engagement have also been
influenced and in fact structured around similar frames. It is only ironic that the
current president of the most powerful country in the world is a former TV
personality obsessed with rating and winning by popularity metrics. One would not
refer to the conducts of a given entertainment business as populist when it aspires to
get higher rating through any means available including extreme displays of
affective expressions and affective connections, etc. However, in politics that would
be characterized as populist. The reason is simply the fact that politics has
traditionally been defined as a realm of arguments, rationality and very calculated
decision making rather than emotionality. So it is not too far-fetched to consider
communication on Social Media as populist in essence and influenced by business
model. Populism in politics is the realm of media savvy political performers who
make colorful claims for grass-root mobilization. Incidentally, media performance,
the claim to empowerment of ordinary citizens, re-connection with politics, grass-
root mobilization all constitute the core claimed characteristics of new digital media
technologies which work with the logic of regimes of popularity building through
‘likes’, ‘shares’ and ‘followers’, etc. Personality politics on Social Media not only
feeds into a highly simplified equation of popularity as legitimacy but at the same
time acts as a revolt against the perceived monolithic nature of traditional mass
media and grand discourses/rationalities. In contrast to rigidity of mass media in
terms of their monopoly over discursive power, the nature, location and dynamic of
discursive power in Social Media or broadly speaking participatory web are fluid,
changeable, and circular (KhosraviNik 2017b; Unger et al. 2016) in a way that users
are at the same time, producers, consumers and distributors of the content. Although
the utopian hopes for enhancement of real public deliberation via the Social Media
and democratization of public sphere have not materialized, these platforms can still
play a significant role for niche politics and non-mainstream representations
(Copsey 2003). The fact remains that given the nature of populism as a style of
communication, the new digital participatory technology is an apt space for
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construction, promotion and dissemination of such politics. This is not to say that
the new communication technologies of participatory web have caused the current
shift to right wing populism. The shift has its own roots in practical democratic
deficit, i.e., socio-political contexts of relevant societies. Nonetheless, the values
and processes at work in Social Media spaces, the political economy of platforms,
and their assumption of post-ideological era and obsoleteness of critical politics are
in line for promoting an affective-driven, anti-establishment, and fringe politics.
Such politics is not built upon argumentation, i.e., rational deliberation in
Habermasian sense but it is largely based on affective communication which
foregrounds what individuals feel, believes and likes over facts, arguments and
logics.
In the meantime, the extreme individualization and the central logic of equating
visibility/popularity with legitimacy in Social Media along with the corporate
algorithmic manipulation of news feeds create a fertile ground for populist
perception and enclaves of like-mindedness (though not similar in all platforms)
because algorithms prioritize relevance over significance. This is primarily a
commercial technique designed to increase sales revenues but nevertheless they also
apply to any socio-political important issue in the form of news and semiotic
content as well. This is not necessarily and directly the overarching aim that the
Social Media platform owners pursue but a natural side effect of their operations.
The leading core principle for Social Media operation is to increase media
consumption. The more users consume, engage with, and contribute to the platform
the more there is added value for the platform. On the one hand, the users’ use of
media turns them into a member of audience for various kinds of advertisements
directed at them and as such increases the value of the platform. On the other hand,
any form of engagement, use, interaction, contribution, sharing content and
information, linking, etc. is considered the trade currency, i.e., information to be
used for commercial purposes, e.g., for more precision targeted advertising,
distribution of advertising content, and various market research operations
(KhosraviNik 2017b). As such, the platforms constantly seek solutions to enhance
use and contributions from users. This is the guiding force for various kinds of
algorithmic rearrangement of the content visible to individual users. For example,
Facebook news feed of every individual is catered around the ‘knowledge’ that the
platform has already gathered on the user (through their entire digital consumptions
on all gadgets and platforms) and the predictions it can make about their political
views, interests, issues, vulnerabilities, belief systems, etc. As such, the platform
works based on the principle of relevance rather than significance. That is, the
platform shows the user what it predicts to be liked/enjoyed by the user rather than
following a public service logic of delivering news to public in terms of reflecting
the world out there to the whole public, i.e., media as the fourth estate. By taking
into account the dominant affective mode of communication, like-minded users
would predominantly see each other’s reactions, news, links, commentaries; a
process which would lead to echo chambers and intensification of the belief
systems. All forms of interactions on Social Media function as a form of promotion
of that content. Whether it is ‘liking’ or ‘commenting’ or ‘sharing’ or ‘tagging’ they
all help that content to become more important and get more exposure so it is
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natural if we avoid engaging with views that we do not like/approve. In other words,
there is a technological design with a consequence of eco chambers. This is also due
to dominance of economic logic on digital spaces; otherwise, the participatory web
could alternatively be used as public sphere for deliberation or expression of
suppressed identities. In line with affective impetus of popularity and legitimacy
building, digital enclaves of like-mindedness are not about new ideas of (critical)
perspective, they are about how well or effectively group members reiterate the
same idea/belief. Hence, the result is intensification of opinions at best, which partly
explains the fake new phenomenon. Algorithmic manipulations types ‘range from
purposes as mundane as deciding the color of a button, to decisions as significant as
which news article is shown to the public. These decisions are in increasingly
central to social, political and civic processes’ (Tufekci 2015: 205). They are
gatekeepers but they are different from their offline, non-interactive and non-
computational counterparts, e.g., in newspapers. In mass media, there is subjectivity
and human factor and obviously possible manipulation. Ideology is there but it is
not automatic and can be attributed to certain (powerful) groups of people (e.g.,
what van Dijk refers to as ‘symbolic elites’) who can be held accountable for
decisions they make. This process is automatic and (arguably) a non-human
operation in digital media. There is no human subjectivity at the local levels of
operation but the entire operation is geared towards enhancement of consumption
(of Social Media) and increasing the contribution of users to the platforms. This is
apart from the paid-for adverting that is becoming increasing common on Social
Media as well.
There is also the fact that Social Media technologies do not recognize society as a
collective public out there unless through their own frame of publics of digital
prosumers. While in mass media operations, everybody gets the same product
(news, shows, films, etc.); Social Media shows different things to different users.
There is no easy way to research the final product, i.e., representation of the world in
Social Media as it is individually catered for. In similar vein, the research shows that
the general public is not sufficiently aware of the quality and extent of such
individually tailored representations on participatory web and in cases they do, there
is little that they can imagine about it. Algorithmic manipulations are nothing short
of new forms of gate-keeping operations with integral consequences in construction
of representational realities, i.e., discourses among users. Algorithmic gate-keeping
is the process by which ‘such nontransparent algorithmic computation tools
dynamically filter, highlight, suppress, or otherwise play an editorial role—fully or
partially—in determining: information flows through online platforms and similar
media’ among other effects (Tufekci 2015: 208).
The algorithmic surveillance of Social Media is not an ideological machine in
traditional sense, i.e., it is mainly automatic and machine controlled whereby human
factor does not normally interfere with the regimentation. Algorithms are able to act
as stealthy, extremely potent gatekeepers unaccompanied by transparency and
visibility (Tufekci 2015: 209). Algorithmic data and interpretation can now
understand information which might have not been openly disclosed, e.g., sexual
orientation, ethnicity, religious and political views, personality traits, intelligence,
happiness, use of addictive substance, parental separation, age, and gender and a lot
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other aspects (ibid: 210). Algorithms shape the perception of the world out there for
users along the lines of what they assume is beneficial for the platform commercial
goals.
The dynamic of discursive power, i.e., snowball effect of discourse foci, is
unpredictable on Social Media communicative paradigm (KhosraviNik
2014, 2017b). The guiding strategy in Social Media design is to loop back users’
digital behaviors and reactions in a way that statistics and volume of interactions,
e.g., ‘likes’, ‘comments’, ‘sharing’, etc. are used to populate certain topics, texts,
sites, or news items. This is why Social Media phenomena expand exponentially
and swiftly. Throughout this process, there is no in-built fact checking mechanism.
In other words, certain news, which may have come to dominate the web, can easily
be false or intentionally fabricated for certain political impact. Social Media are
about visibility/popularity not facts. They do not have the design capacity with
regard to veracity of the content. In fact, as far as the dominant rational of Social
Media are concerned, there is no logical incentive or sensible room for integration
of such concerns into the technological design. Yet there is an unprecedented
accumulation of discursive power in such technological regimentation of content.
The current design rules out factuality in favor of resonance with audiences; hence,
there is a strong digital nudge for users/ordinary members of the public to
automatically equate visibility/popularity of a piece of news to its creditability. This
is the very essence of an epistemological shift brought about by the triumph and
hyper-normalization of market logic of exchange value. The essence of Social
Media is creditability gained by visibility/popularity in a context where popularity
results in commercial gains regardless of the consequences. This is about extending
commercial domain logic, i.e., higher demand is higher value to sphere of politics,
which could amount to disastrous results. In other words, Social Media could
actually function as spaces for democratic practice, but the dominance of
commercial rationality has diminished this potential and, in many ways, destroyed
this capacity. Obviously, these effects are different in different Social Media
platforms, e.g., compare Facebook with Twitter but nevertheless, the central logic of
corporatized participatory web is the same. Once again this is about colonization of
what could be appropriated as new public sphere by corporate forces and a digital
version of market economy, which is plaguing the ideal potential of the new media
spaces. This is the same force, which is an increasing threat to traditional mass
media as well.
The New Media technology literature is full of undertones of claims to post-
ideological era, partly coming from media deterministic understanding and partly
impacted by new psychological approaches. In many trends of thoughts notions like
ideology, discourse and representations are cast aside as being irrelevant in the
study of New Media technology. However, the claim to post-ideology is already a
strictly ideological stance at its core. In most cases, this is about assuming the
triumph of market economy and neo-liberalism over all aspects of social and
personal life including media technologies. Post-ideology thesis in the meantime
trivializes the democratic struggles and values in a way that the whole democra-
tization project is deliberately and misleadingly reduced to forms of direct opinion
gathering mechanism. This simplified understanding of democracy reduces it to
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merely a polling mechanism and disregards the requirements of systems of checks
and balances, liberal civil laws, civil society apparatus, fourth estate media etc.,
which are part and parcel of the original democratic thought and enlightenment. In
many ways, Social Media sensations are inherently populist phenomenon. This is
not a problem in and by itself but the permeation of the principle of visibility-
equals-legitimacy and the claim that Social Media are empowering the voiceless can
have counterparts in structural politics of populism in which the populists
predominately make anti-establishment claims, disregard for norms and values
inherent in democracies and usually make pledges to overthrow the system in the
benefit of ‘the real people’. The problem is not in the practice; it is about the
philosophical essence that Social Media implicitly push forward. You could argue
that democracy is about gaining popularity which is right but the point always
missed is that democracy is not just about gaining popularity, it is about having a
viable apparatus for rational argumentation and expression of all ideas, e.g., a
healthy civic media system. It is about having systems of fact checking and
accountability, division of powers, anchorage to central civil principles, etc. Social
Media seem to have removed all requirements of democracy and dangerously
reduced it to a participatory reality TV. In that sense, Social Media politics has
created a fertile space of growth of populist politics or a form of haphazard populist
ground in every sense. Trump performance in the US is a prime example of this
trend both in terms of the content of his discourse as well as the centrality of Social
Media practice in his operation.
Social Media are characterized as the realm of affects, connections and personal
sharing. In turn, it is argued that it is now the age of affective (rather than
deliberative) politics, i.e., the age of prioritizing feelings over facts. It is the age
where rationality takes a back seat in favor of relationality. New digital media are
not the cause of this turn. There are sociological and cultural reasons for populist
tendencies in the west and indeed around the globe. There are wider ontological
shifts in politics and the world imaginary, which have caused this turn. Social Media
are both the product and at the same time perpetuator of such preference. That is
why their guiding logic resonates with contemporary people. Social Media at the
age of behavioral adverting are the epitome of preference of relevance over
significance. Social Media are about your life, what you like, what you feel and they
cater towards what you prefer by constantly monitoring your online behavior. This
is of course done to maximize profit through targeted adverting and promotions.
Social Media do not show you the world out there, they construct a world to your
liking and as such they are breeding ground for echo chambers, and constructions of
filter bubbles where all like-minded people get together and reinforce their own
perception of the realities and priorities rather than engaging with other views.
Having said all the above, this is wrong to assume that Social Media have had a
causal effect on the shift to right wing populism. Politics is primarily about the
society, its internal struggles and shifts in social contexts. Any analysis of role of
media in politics is primarily instituted in society. Technologies of communication
are also part of this social context as well-being means of political discourse and
practice. In the same vein, the rise of right wing populism (i.e., the support from the
underclass) is basically a protest against normalization of neo-liberal economy,
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economic globalization, pursuit of growth, disregarding issues around distribution
of wealth and the constant normalization of such practices, which has constituted a
democratic deficit in the west. Yet, the political impact of techno-discursive design
of media in general and Social Media in particular should be considered in this
equation, not the least in terms of their mutual impact. Algorithms are ideologically
laden systems, which work with a normalized market logic in line with the
increasing corporatization of digital platforms. Algorithms may not care about the
politics per se but they do have a political impact in the way they regiment the
content for users and general public. Computer systems are not automatic and free
from ideology in their design. They are deliberately organized around a form of
digital market economic perspective, e.g., a misconstrued interpretation of gift
economy through the processes of playbour and digital labour (Fuchs 2014) but at
the same time making claims to empowerment of ordinary people and democra-
tizing of access to symbolic and representational resources and identity perfor-
mances. In pursuing that they have interest in projecting a post-political facade.
Research approaches in media and technology and waves of research influenced by
affect theory with their psychological overtone seem to work on propagated
assumptions that envisage the society devoid of the classic political struggles. What
remains is that as far as the critical and socially oriented commitment of research is
taken into account, e.g., in Social Media critical discourse studies, contextualization
of research cannot do without notions of power, and discourse. It is very evident that
affective aspect is a crucially relevant aspect of research on Social Media. In other
words, new approaches in critical discourse analysis should meaningfully engage
with these aspects and literature. However, it remains unclear how an epistemo-
logical and ontological neutralization of approaches in critical media studies would
be a step forward in the field. On the other hand, it is one thing to acknowledge that
the affective side of communication has always been part of human communication
and one of the important features in persuasion and discourse studies, but it is
another thing to aspire to explain the turn to post-rationality and pot-deliberation as
step forward in western understanding of polity and democratic understanding.
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